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Introduction 
Multilateral trade liberalization has been the vision of trade theorists for decades.  The most recent 
vision has been to achieve freer global trade through negotiations in the Uruguay Round under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.  That hope for reinvigorating the torpid world economy has faded.  Nations 
are searching for a new trade paradigm that offers an alternative to unilateralism (e.g. Export Enhancement 
Program, the defunct Super 301, etc.) and multilateralism.  Regionalism as apparent in free trade groupings of 
countries is an alternative paradigm.  It offers both pitfalls and promise. 
Objective 
The objective  of this  paper is  to  analyze  the economic implications for American food  praducers, 
consumers, and society of alternative Pacific Rim free trade region (FIR) configurations.  Of the five potential 
free trade regions analyzed in this study and listed below, the first two do not include the U.S. 
1.  ASEAN Free  Trade Region -- Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand.  The region 
already exists as an association of cooperating countries, but it does not have free trade. 
2.  East Asia Free  Trade  Region  -- Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and "Other East Asian Countries· 
(Hong Kong, Singapore). 
3.  East Asia-U.S. Free  Trade Region -- same countries as above but including the U.S. 
4.  Westem  Hemisphere  Free  Trade  Region  -- U.S.,  Canada, Mexico,  "Other Central American and 
Caribbean Countries,· Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, and ·Other Latin American Countries.· 
5.  Pacific Rim Free  Trade Region -- combined East Asia FrR, ASEAN FIR, Western Hemisphere 
FIR, and Australia and New Zealand. 
The  conclusion  of this  paper is  that  a  comprehensive Pacific Rim FrR offers  essentially  all  the 
advantages  attainable from  multilateral free  trade in agriculture -- given  that Europe, as  evidenced by the 
Uruguay Round, has opted out of a global free trade arrangement. 
Emerging Trade Regions 
As always, the world simultaneously is in a centrifugal process of fragmentation as in Eastern Europe 
and a centripetal process of amalgamation.  In addition to existing free trade regions (FrRs) such as Canada-
U.S. and the European Community, several regions are in various stages of realization: 
North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA):  Prospects for combining the low-cost labor of Mexico with 
the capital and technology of Canada and the US make NAFrA attractive.  Fruits and vegetables would flow 
north from  Mexico  and grains  and  soybeans  would  flow  south to Mexico.  The NAFrA is  opposed by 
environmentalists and labor unions but could become a reality in the 1990s. 
Mercosur.  Originated in 1988 as a free trade pact between Brazil and Argentina, it expanded to include 
Uruguay and Paraguay in March 1991.  The intent is for free trade in goods, services, and labor by 1994. 
"Anderson Professor of Agricultural Marketing, Policy, and Trade, Department of  Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, The Ohio 
State University,  Columbus; Agricultural Economist, Economic Research Setvice,  U.S.  Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC; 
Member of  Agriculture and Economics Faculty, Northeastern Oklahoma A&M College, Miami; and Professor, Department of  Agricultural 
Economics and Rural Sociology, The Ohio State University, Columbus.  Comments of Shiva Makki are appreciated. 
1 Central America.  Central America is attempting to revive a common market (CACM) established in 
the 1960s and lost in 1969 with war between Honduras and El Salvador.  A common market, to be established 
by 1994, would include EI Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM).  Attempts at a CARICOM customs union under auspices of the 
Caribbean Community have  been attempted since  1991.  English-speaking  countries  of the  Caribbean are 
included. 
Westem Hemisphere FTA.  President George Bush proposed an Enterprise for the Americas Initiative 
(EAI) to include countries of NOI'th and South America.  The area could be formed by merging NAFI'A with 
existing free trade associations in South and Central America. 
East  Asian Economic Group (EAEG).  In April 1991, Malaysia proposed the EAEG to include ASEAN 
countries of southeast Asia as well  as  China, Japan, Hong Kong,  Taiwan,  and South Korea.  The original 
proposal was floated after the December 1990 meeting of world trade ministers under auspices of the GAIT 
in Brussels.  The intent was  for EAEG to formulate  a common trade position for  the GATT negotiations. 
Differences between Japan and selected other proposed members run too deep for early reconciliation to form 
a free trade area.  But if  European and Western Hemisphere free trade associations succeed, the principle of 
countervailing power will create strong incentives to form an Asian bloc along lines of the proposed EAEG. 
This brief summary of emerging FI'Rs illustrates that the configurations analyzed in this  study (see 
Objective) are more than academic abstractions.  The configurations have been seriously proposed (For a more 
complete listing of FI'R overtures between the u.S. and Asian countries, and also Australia, see Schott, pp. 27-
49). 
Review of Literature and Concepts 
Most empirical studies of agricultural trade liberalization have accepted geographic trade borders as they 
exist rather than in new preferential trade configurations. Exceptions include a study of a Japan-U.S. Free Trade 
Area (Gleckler and Tweeten), an expanded European Community to encompass the European Free Trade 
Association and Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland (Gleckler et al.), and a number of studies of a North 
American Free Trade Association (Grennes et al.; Robinson et al.). 
A considerable literature addresses the theoretical advantages and disadvantages of free trade regions 
(see Viner; Wonnacott and Lutz).  Much of this literature assumes a customs union (common external barriers 
among FTR members to trade with the rest of the world (ROW) and free trade among members in goods and 
services but not in factors of production such as labor).  The assumption of a customs union simplifies empirical 
analysis  compared to the assumption of a free  trade area  (free trade within FTR but each member can have 
unique barriers to outsiders as in the European Free Trade Association) or a common market (free trade within 
FI'R in goods and services as well as in factors of production such as labor and capital). 
Advantages of Regionalism 
Free trade regions would have little purpose if multilateral negotiations under the GATT succeeded. 
But multilateral negotiations offer only limited liberalization.  Major advantages of regionalism are: 
•  Changes can be made incrementally.  Adding one or just a few countries at a time reduces shock to 
affected industries and the rest of the world.  Only countries which have prepared themselves to 
enter a FI'R need to be signatories to an agreement.  One proposal is that the United States become 
the nucleus of an open ended FTR.  Any nation that agreed to open trade could join that FI'R. 
Such regionalism could be viewed as a step towards global free  trade.  It is  conceivable that all 
nations eventually would join the FI'R.  In general, the larger the FTR the less the trade diversion 
away from non-members and the greater the welfare gain. 
•  Benefits are more transparent.  Affected industries and others can more easily predict and adjust to 
impacts if  free trade is regional rather than global. 
•  Negotiations are less complex.  It is  difficult indeed for  108  countries to negotiate and come to a 
GATT agreement.  Smaller groups of countries with the same cultural heritage or other common 
interests can reach agreement more easily. 
2 •  FTAs can  ignore footdraggers.  If  the European Community for example does not want free trade, 
it can be ignored in regional agreements. 
•  FTAs can be the building blocks to merge for international trade liberalization. 
•  Free trade regions offer advantages for economic efficiency.  These advantages will become more clear 
after we review previous studies, conceptual issues, and empirical results. 
Regionalism also has drawbacks: 
•  Free trade nations are likely to raise internal prices and hence protection from  trade with outsiders to 
induce internal cohesion -- despite violation of Article 24 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade.  The result is likely to be a reduction in global economic welfare. 
•  Free trade regions are likely to exclude developing countries even as they make trade among affluent 
countries  more  open.  Only  developed  countries  have  formed  successful  free  trade  regions. 
Developing countries have formed FfRs but the regions have not been successful on economic or 
political grounds.  However, developed country FfRs can benefit developing countries as trade wars 
among FfRs cheapen deVeloping country imports. 
•  Free trade regions can encourage factionalism.  Trade regions of  "fortress America," "fortress Europe," 
and "fortress east Asia" could be a world of trade wars, survival of the fittest, discrimination against 
non-members, shifting coalitions, and instability. As Robert Lawrence noted, FIRs can be stumbling 
blocks rather than building blocks. 
•  The  General Agreement on  Tariffs  and  Trade  could be further  weakened.  The GATT is  already 
troubled by lack  of enforcement capabilities,  and by lack  of coverage  of agriculture, intellectual 
property, services, investment, and nontariff barriers to trade.  Regionalism could distract GATT 
members from multilateral solutions to these problems. 
•  Producers receive fewer benefits under regionalism than under multilateralism.  A free trade region can 
offer deep but narrow (a few countries) moves toward free trade.  Incremental changes mean that 
world agricultural commodity prices, for example, rise less for regional than for global free trade --
hence regional free trade offers less compensation to producers for loss of commodity price support 
programs  than does  global  free  trade.  Producers are often  the  decisive  group in  the  national 
decisions to liberalize trade. 
Conceptual Framework 
A free trade region (FfR) can follow four scenarios:  (1) a net exporting region in which each nation 
is an exporter, (2) a net importing region in which each nation is an importer, (3) a net exporting region with 
both importing and  exporting countries, and (4)  a  net importing region with  both importing and  exporting 
countries.  The ability  of the FfR to increase total welfare  of the region as  a whole and of the individual 
member nations is a function of the above scenarios. 
The following analysis rests on several assumptions: 
1.  The region is a customs union made up of two countries which together constitute a small-country 
case with respect to the rest of the world (ROW). 
2.  Tariffs on imports or subsidies on exports are used to maintain prices in the FfR that differ from 
world prices. 
3.  Upon implementation of a FfR, consumers and producers in both countries receive a common 
regional price which is determined by the free market equilibrium within the region while trade with 
the rest of the world remains fIXed  at the pre-FIR level.  This equilibrium regional price results 
from eliminating market distortions between free trade region countries.  Thus by assumption the 
FfR neither creates nor diverts trade with ROW. 
4.  The conceptual model does not examine a case in which the producer or consumer price is lower 
than world price because the equilibrium producer and consumer price in each Pacific Rim country 
simulated empirically was above the world price in 1986.  In each scenario modeled conceptually and 
empirically, the within-FfR trade-balancing equilibrium price turns out to be between the lowest 
price and the highest price found among member countries. 
3 In Figure 1,  the two hypothetical importing countries in the free trade region are depicted as a net 
importing free trade·region.  p. and Pb  represent the prevailing prices (consumer and producer price) in the 
representative countries before the implementation of the free trade region.  Initially, Country A's price is below 
Country B's price.  Upon implementation of the FfR, prices in both countries are set at Pr  consistent with DO 
net change in trade with ROW.  Under the FfR illustrated, the decrease in imports to Country A is equal to 
the increase in imports of Country B.  In short: 
p  .. =  World price  Pr  =  Equilibrium FfR price 
p. =  Initial price in Country A  P  b  =  Initial price in Country B 
O~  - 0;' - (Odb-Oll»  =  Oda - O. - (O~-O;.) =  0 
Increased imports of B  =  Decreased imports of A with FfR. 
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Figure 1.  Net Importing Region:  Both Countries are Net Importers. 
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The welfare analysis for three comparisons is as follows (refer to Figure 1): 
1.  Social (deadweight) gain moving from pre-FfR policies at p. and Pb  to a global free market. 
Country A  Country B 
Gain to: 
Producers  -k 
Consumers  g+h+i+j+k+m 
Government  ""'-g  ....  -h  ...  - .....  i ___  _ 
Net  j+m 
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8+10 3.  Social gain moving from pre-FTR to FTR or (1) - (2). 
Country A  Country B 
Gain to: 
Producers  a + b  -1 
Consumers  -a-b-c-d-e  1+2+3+4 
Government  d-g-i  -3+5+7 
Net  -c-e-g-i  2+4+5+7 
loint  b+f+2+4 = a+{J (Given b+c+e+f+g+i = 5+7) 
The above results show that both countries realize a net gain moving from initial interventions (scenario 
1) and a free trade region (scenario 2) to a global free market.  Moving from  the initial situation to the free 
trade region in (3) above, consumers lose in Country A and gain in Country B.  The reverse holds for producers. 
Compared to a free market, net national welfare (income) is reduced more by the FIR than by initial distortions 
in Country A.  In contrast, net social cost is greater in Country B with initial policies than with the FIR. 
Scenario 3 shows the net social benefit from the FTR (price at Pr)  compared to the pre-FIR policies 
with domestic price at p. and P  b.  The total welfare in the region depends on the magnitude of the gains in 
CountryB (area 2+4+5+7) compared to the losses (area c+e+g+i) in Country A. Net gain is b+f+2+4=a+{J 
to the region. 
The most important conclusion is  that the FTR is unequivocally positive for  the region as  a whole. 
However, Country A is worse off and Country B is better off with the FIR.  Country A presumably agrees to 
the arrangement because it has other commodities providing gains or it is compensated by B. 
Figure 2 depicts a net exporting FTR in which both countries are exporters.  The intra-regional trade 
market (third panel in Figure 1) is omitted in Figure 2 to save space.  The initial domestic price p. in Country 
A is lower than the initial price Pb  in Country B.  After formulation of a free trade region, the new common 
regional price  is  P  r  Total exports  of the region  after formatton  of the  FTR remain unchanged  from  the 
Price 
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Figure 2.  Net Exporting Region:  Both Countries are Net Exporters. 
5 initial quantity.  That is,  the increase in Country A's exports under a FI'R equals the decrease in Country B's 
exports under the common regional price P  r"  Assumptions are summarized as follows: 
Pw  =  World price  Pr  =  Equilibrium FI'R price 
p. =  Initial price in Country A  P  b  =  Initial price in Country B 
0;' - O~  - (O  ..  -O.J = 0.., - Oclb - (O~-O~) = 0 
Increased exports from A  =  Decreased exports from B with FI'R. 
Due to the higher price, producers gain and consumers lose in Country A.  The opposite holds in 
Country B. 
The government in Country A originally incurs an export subsidy of area h + i + j. With implementation 
of a free  trade region,  the subsidy becomes area b + c + d + e + f + g + h + i + j + k.  Therefore, with  a FI'R, the 
government in Country A incurs an additional subsidy b+c+d+e+f+g+k. 
The welfare analysis of the FTR as compared to the original situation at p. and Pb  is as follows  (see 
Figure 2): 
CountrY A  CountrY B 
Gain to: 
Producers  a+b+c+d+e  -1-2-3 
Consumers  -a-b  1 + 2 
Government  -b-c-d-e-f-g-k  2+3+4+6+10 
Net  -b-f-g-k  2+4+6+  10 
Joint  2+4+c+e (Given b+c+e+f+g+k =  6+10) 
From the above analysis, Country A losses and Country B gains.  However, the FI'R as a whole gains 
2+4+c+e in the absence of trade creation or diversion with ROW. 
In Figure 3, Country A is assumed to be an importing country and Country B an exporting country. 
Together, they form  a FTR.  A and B may be a net exporting or importing region but net trade remains the 
same from A and B to ROW before and after the FTR.  Initial prices are p. and Pb•  Under the FTR scenario, 
the common regional price is P  r"  Assumptions are as follows: 
Pw  =  World price 
p. =  Initial price in Country A 
O~  - 0;' - (0.-0..) =  O~  - O~  - (Olb-Oclb) 
Pb  =  Initial price in Country B 
Pr  =  Equilibrium FTR price 
Increased imports of A  =  Increased exports of B after FI'R. 
In Country A, producers lose and consumers gain.  The opposite is true in Country B.  Initially, the 
government in Country A collects c+frevenues from an import tariff.  After formation of the FI'R, government 
tariff revenue is e+f+g for a net gain of e+g-c.  Initially, the government of B paid a subsidy of 8+9+10 on 
exports  and after the FTR a  subsidy of area 2 through 11.  Thus the FI'R cost the government of B  the 
additional subsidy of 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 + 11. 
The amount exported (imported) to the rest of the world is subsidized (taxed) to maintain the regional 
price at Pr  and leave net exports (imports) to ROW unchanged.  Net welfare gain from the FI'R compared to 
the initial situation is as follows  (see Figure 3): 
CountrY A  CountrY B 
Gain to: 
Producers  -a  1+2+3+4+5 
Consumers  a+b+c+d  -1-2 
Government  e + g-c  -2-3-4-5-6-7-11 
Net  b+d+e+g  -2-6-7-11 
Joint  b+d+3+5 (Given e+g = 2+3+5+6+7+  11) 
The conclusion again is that the joint regional benefit from the FTR is unequivocally positive (area b + d + 3 + 5) 
although Country A gains at the expense of Country B. 
Nothing is specified about the size of imports of Country A (0.-0..) relative to exports of Country B 
(QIb-Odb)'  hence the FTR may be a net exporter or net importer.  If  the region is a net importer, Country B 
could export all its excess supply to Country A, presumably with no subsidy by B and with no tax received by 






Country  A 
a 








Country  B 
o  ~bOdb  O.bO:b 
Ouantity 
Figure 3.  Net Exporting or Importing Region:  One Country is a Net Importer and One Country is a Net 
Exporter. 
import tariff revenue and B will pay no export subsidies.  The net impact of the FrR for the region will be as 
shown in the above welfare analysis but the gain to A will be reduced and to B will be increased by the amount 
of the tax-subsidy transfer.  Thus whether the region is a net importer or exporter, the specific arrangements of 
A  and B  for  sharing taxes  and  subsidies will  influence  the  distribution  among producers,  consumers,  and 
taxpayers and the country net payoff.  But such redistributions are only transfers if decoupled from incentives 
to produce, consume, and trade so that the net welfare benefit b +  d +  3 +  5 will remain. 
Attributes of Worthy FTR Members 
The foregoing conceptual framework and literature review provide insights into who the United States 
should look to for partners in a free trade region.  The short answer is that it should look for all nations.  Global 
multilateral free trade is optimal.
1  Some additional guidelines are as follows: 
1.  Other things equal, a free trade region ideally includes neighbors (Krugman).  Partly because of low 
transport and communication costs, countries disproportionately trade with their neighbors.  Gains 
from trade are approximately proportional to the trade volume among nations. 
2.  Gains  from  trade  are  greatest  among  nations  with  unlike  resource  endowments,  comparative 
advantage, and tastes.  Thus while (1) above calls for the U.S. to favor a free trade region including 
Canada, (2) calls for free trade with East Asia. 
1  A world in which each nation has no bargaining power, hence optimally forsakes trade barrieIS, and is in essence a mini-PTR also 
is optimal.  Somewhere between the optimums of (a) a single global free trade region and (b) each individual nation being a free trade 
region is the worse of all worlds.  Krugman contends from mathematical calculations that the WOISt of all worlds is three free trade areas. 
Ironically. that is what has materialized with the Be, Canada-U.s., and Japan trade areas. 
7 3.  Economic theory holds that the internal gains from a FTR are greatest where pre-fiR prices differ 
most among countries and where demand and supply are relatively elastic. 
Other Gains from FTRs 
Aside from  issues of trade creation or trade diversion with ROW, a FTR offers numerous economic 
benefits to members. 
1.  The previous analysis indicated that even with no change in trade with ROW, a FTR creates net 
economic welfare internally by shifting production from  high cost to low cost FTR members and 
shifting consumption from those with low marginal utility to those with high marginal utility.  It is 
apparent from the conceptual models shown earlier that global gains from a FTR will be greater the 
closer regional prices are set to world equilibrium free trade prices. 
2.  The largest economic gains from agricultural free trade arise from altering commodity programs to 
end market distortions.  Benefits are likely to go mostly to consumers and taxpayers.  Producers can 
be compensated  for  losses,  preferably by  decoupled  payments  that  do  not  distort  production, 
consumption, or trade. 
3.  A FTR promotes specialization and economies of size.  A FTR may provide sufficient assurances 
of reliable supplies so that countries will be willing to forego costly attempts at import substitution 
and self-sufficiency.  Greater national income in the short run contributes to savings and investment 
in human, material, and technological capital for long-term national income "growth.  We can call 
these combined influences internal trade creation. 
4.  A FTR increases bargaining power vis-a-vis  other nations.  At best, bargaining power can induce 
other nations to forego  trade distortions and can induce global free trade.  At worst, bargaining 
power in one FTR induces countervailing power in other FTRs, leading to trade wars and economic 
losses. 
5.  A FTR reduces bargaining power of concentrated domestic industries and hence reduces deadweight 
costs from  imperfect competition.  Free trade has diminished the once awesome market power of 
General Motors and the United Auto Workers, for example.  The result is improved products at 
lower prices to consumers. 
6.  A fiR can improve balance of payments (see Bergsten, p. 31).  An advantage of an East Asia FTR 
is that it includes countries with large trade surpluses with the U.S.  A fiR could speed the process 
of reducing these surpluses.  In contrast, a Western Hemisphere FTR would include countries with 
large trade deficits.  The countries using the FTR to more efficiently reduce their trade deficits 
would not help the U.S. trade balance. 
Empirical Procedure 
The empirical analysis includes each of the five FTRs listed earlier under the objective.  Detailed results 
for all five are reported in the Annex.  Here results are reported only for the three regions that include the U.S. 
The subsequent section on trade creation and diversion will  discuss selected results for the ASEAN and East 
Asia FTRs that do not include the U.S. 
The procedure is to simulate prices, quantities, and economic welfare implications by country and region 
unger each of the above fiR scenarios.  Results shown in the text are mostly for the U.S.  Economic outcomes 
for each of four major commodities and for each FTR member country are shown in Annex tables.  The Annex 
includes results for  an East Asia FTR and ASEAN FTR (without the U.S.)  as well  as for  the three FTR 
scenarios listed above. 
The empirical model was generated using the Static World Policy Simulation (SWOPSIM) framework 
(see Roningen et al.) adapted at The Ohio State University to estimate impacts of free trade regions.  Base data 
and parameters are for 1986.  Predicted outcomes are for an intermediate-run of five years after formation of 
the respective free  trade regions versus continuation of 1986  policies.  Results assume within  the FTR (1) 
termination of commodity program and border interventions to trade, (2) free trade among members, and (3) 
trade unchanged from the 1986 level with non-fiR members.  Prices and quantities may be viewed as breakeven 
8 levels between trade diversion and trade creation.2  That is, if  prices are lowered from the equilibriums shown 
within  the FfR, the FfR will be trade  creating with  respect  to  outsiders.  If prices  are raised  from  the 
equilibriums shown, the FfR will be trade diverting. 
Results 
Results are presented fIrst for U.S. production, consumption, and trade (Table 1) under various FfRs. 
The East Asia-U.S. FfR containing few  exporters competing with the U.S.  and containing large consumer 
demand in East Asia is most favorable for American producers.  Under that FfR, the U.S. experiences trade 
reversal in beef.  Initially a net importer of 739 thousand (metric) tons, the U.S. as part of the East Asia-U.S. 
FfR becomes a modest net exporter of 19 thousand tons.  U.S. production also increases but consumption falls 
because of higher beef prices.  U.S. coarse grain (mostly corn) and rice exports expand under the East Asia-U.S. 
FfR. American sugar imports increase, but not nearly as much as with a Western Hemisphere or Pacific Rim 
FfR. The latter region includes efficient sugar producers in Australia as well as in Central America and Brazil. 
Table 1.  U.S. Production, Consumption, and Net Trade with Free Trade Regions, 1986. 
Free Trade Region 
East Asia- Western  Pacific 
Commodity  Original  U.s.  Hemisphere  Rim 
(1,000 Tons) 
Beef 
Production  11,292  11,486  10,227  10,554 
Consumption  12,031  11,467  12,317  12,096 
Trade·  -739  19  -2,089  -1,542 
Wheat 
Production  56,925  53,140  46,843  44,536 
Consumption  30,173  26,822  28,062  28,688 
Trade  26,752  26,319  18,781  15,848 
Coarse Grain 
Production  252,948  242,264  225,316  224,574 
Consumption  206,507  192,988  196,633  198,257 
Trade  46,441  49,275  28,683  26,317 
Rice 
Production  4,280  5,254  3,687  3,985 
Consumption  1,644  1,262  1,567  1,511 
Trade  2,636  3,992  2,120  2,474 
Slfgar 
Production  5,461  5,391  3,747  4,014 
Consumption  7,158  7,542  8,089  8,012 
Trade  -1,697  -2,151  -4,342  -3,998 
I  Positive onginal means net exports, negatIve means net Imports. 
~e  breakeven reference for trade diversion or creation here is regional price p. rather than the initial prices p. and P, in Figures 
1 to 3.  That concept differs from conventional usage where trade creation or diversion is measured from initial conditions. 
9 As expected, American wheat, coarse grain, and rice production and trade are set back when confronted 
with strong competition from Argentina, Brazi~ Canada, Australia, and other agricultural countries in a Western 
Hemisphere or Pacific Rim FTR.  Production and export data indicate that an East Asia-U.S. FTR is most 
favorable and a Western Hemisphere FTR or Pacific Rim FTR is least favorable to American agriculture.  The 
opposite conclusion holds for consumers. 
Price changes in Table 2 help to explain some of the quantity patterns just discussed.  Because free trade 
is not possible without restructuring commodity programs to remove price distortions, producer prices fall. 
Decoupled payments could compensate producers for lower prices but at the expense of taxpayers or consumers. 
Positive net welfare gains shown later for FTRs indicate that U.S. producers could be made better off  with F'fRs 
(despite lower prices) while government (taxpayers)  and consumers are made no worse off.  The principal 
contribution of Table 2 is to illustrate relative price impacts among the three FTRs.  Beef and rice prices are 
helped by an East Asia-U.S. FTR.  Of the three FTRs shown, a Western Hemisphere FTR generally is least 
favorable to prices. 
Table 2.  U.s. Price Changes with Free Trade Regions, 1986. 
Free Trade Region 
Original  East Asia- Western  Pacific 
Commodity  Price  U.S.  Hemisphere  Rim 
($/Ton)  (Percent Increase in Price) 
Beef 
Production  2,049  3  -14  -10 
Consumption  3,414  7  -3  -1 
Wheat 
Production  168  -12  -31  -36 
Consumption  122  51  25  17 
Coarse Grain 
Production  102  -9  -22  -24 
Consumption  78  29  12  10 
Rice 
Production  348  67  -31  14 
Consumption  244  188  21  113 
Sugar 
Production  324  -5  -56  -37 
Consumption  885  -20  -40  -31 
Economic welfare (national income) gains are sizable for  each FTR shown in Table 3 but for the 
W.estern Hemisphere and Pacific Rim FTRs are about five  times greater than for an East Asia-U.S. FTR.  In 
contrast, American producers (and government) gain nearly three times as much surplus (overall net income) 
with an East Asia-U.S. FTR as with either of the other two FTRs.  The high man-land ratio agricultures of  East 
Asia are a favorable match for free trade with the relatively low man-land ratio American agriculture.  (Producer 
and government gains are combined in Table 3 because decoupled payments can in principle provide almost any 
income distribution between producers and government with the restructured non-trade-distorting commodity 
programs assumed herein without changing other outcomes shown.)  A  producers-government welfare loss 
coupled with a positive overall welfare gain as in the case of beef and sugar indicates that the government alone 
could not compensate producers out of welfare gains so that taxpayers would be no worse off and producers 
10 better off.  However, some of the benefits to consumers could be used to compensate producers so that each 
group -- producers, consumers, taxpayers, and society -- is made better off. 
American consumers tend to benefit somewhat more overall from a Western Hemisphere FfR than 
Pacific Rim FfR in Table 3 because Argentina drives down beef prices while Brazil and Central America drive 
down sugar prices.  For American food producers and consumers as a whole, however, there is little to chose 
between a Western Hemisphere or Pacific Rim FTR.  Whereas either FfR provides large aggregate  welfare 
gains, the Western Hemisphere FTR especially favors consumers while the Pacific Rim FTR especially favors 
producers. 
Table 3. U.s. Welfare Analysis Showing Producer-Government Surplus, Consumer Surplus, and Total Welfare 
Gain with Free Trade Regions, 1986. 
Free Trade Region 
Commodity and  East Asia- Western  Pacific 
Welfare Surplus  U.s.  Hemisphere  Rim 
($ Million) 
Beef 
Producers-government  2,635  -1,184  -280 
Consumers  -2,845  1,369  ill 
Total  -210  185  35 
Wheat 
Producers-government  1,902  2,564  2,134 
Consumers  -1,742  -891  -626 
Total  160  1,673  1,508 
Coarse Grain 
Producers-government  4,932  3,907  3,655 
Consumers  -4,455  -1,843  -1.542 
Total  477  2,064  2,113 
Rice 
Producers-government  521  401  670 
Consumers  ~  -125  -233 
Total  -U7  276  437 
Sugar 
Producers-government  -682  -2,613  -2,517 
Consumers  1,272  2,942  2,751 
Total  590  329  234 
Overall U.S. 
Producers-government  9,308  3,075  3,662 
Consumers  -8.418  1.452  665 
Total  890  4,527  4,327 
Only the food and agriculture industry is  modeled herein.  It is  quite possible that inclusion of non-
agricultural industries in FfRs would give very different overall welfare conclusions.  While the relative and 
absolute distribution of costs and benefits would differ from those shown, the overall welfare gains would be 
larger with non-agricultural industries included in FfRs. 
11 Trade Creation and Diversion with ROW? 
Theory and empirical results (see Annex) support the conclusion that free trade within regions raises 
regional economic welfare by the same forces that increase global economic welfare from global free trade.  By 
assuming trade with ROW in unchanged, we have assumed away a critical issue, however -- the impact of a FTR 
on the economic welfare of  ROW.  We address that issue below within the context of trade diversion or creation 
(see Viner). 
The most commonly recognized impact of a FTR on ROW is trade diversion.  An example is  Spain 
joining the EC.  Before joining the EC, Spain imported feed grains from the U.S., a low-cost producer.  After 
joining the EC, the variable levy imposed by the Community made feed grain imports from the U.S. so expensive 
that France, a high-cost producer, became the lowest-cost source of feed grain to Spain.  Trade diversion from 
a low-cost source to a high-cost source caused a net welfare loss to the U.S., Spain, and the world. 
World welfare also is reduced by inefficient consumption patterns under a FTR that raises regional price 
above the world price.  As a result, consumers in the FTR forego consumption they value more than the world 
cost of production (opportunity cost P  w in Figure 3, the value of other commodities given up) while consumers 
in ROW consume output they value less than the world cost of production. 
Figure 4 illustrates impacts of a FTR on ROW in a two-region world.  The most efficient outcome is 
at P  Vi'  Assume that in the FTR the price is raised to Pr and in ROW it falls to PRO  If FTR is an exporter as in 
the top panel A  of Figure 4,  producers lose area 1 and consumers gain area 1 +  2 for a net gain of area 2 to 
ROW.  If  the FTR is a net importer as in the lower panel B, producers in ROW lose a +  b, consumers gain a, 
and ROW is worse off by area b.  Thus ROW is unequivocally neither worse off nor better off from a FTR. 
As noted above,  however, the world as a whole is likely to be worse off to the extent that the FTR further 
distorts world prices above or below p  .... 
High support prices, realization of economies of size, and specialization that attend the FTR may cause 
exports to increase beyond the initial level, lowering world price.  This would make competing producers worse 
off, consumers better off, and ROW as a whole better off.  The EC is an example. 
Some general guidelines follows from Figure 4.  The guidelines assume that a FTR will raise internal 
prices and lower ROW prices. 
1.  A FTR will be trade creating and will benefit ROW if  the FTR is an exporter (A in Figure 4) but 
will be trade diverting and will reduce economic welfare in ROW if  the FTR is an importer (B in 
Figure 4). 
2.  Producers lose and consumers gain in ROW whether the scenario is A or B in Figure 4.  On the 
other hand, producers gain and consumers lose in the FTR.  Because producers tend to dominate 
trade politics,  one would  expect FTRs to form  because producers within  FTRs gain.  ROW's 
producers lose,  but they have  little bargaining power to stop the FTR.  However, Figure 4  is 
oversimplified.  Producers may be unenthusiastic in support of a FTR if  it means sacrifice of current 
commodity programs. Figure 4 indicates that producers globally might prefer multilateral free trade 
because regionalism can impose burdens on producers left out of FTRS.3 
At issue  is  whether a  Pacific Rim FTR would  in fact  be trade creating or diverting  for  ROW if 
arrangements for all products were along lines designated in the earlier model for agriculture.  Would trade be 
diverted from lower cost producers in ROW to higher cost producers in the FTR? If  the lowest cost producers 
ar~  in the FTR, trade diversion is unlikely.  Discussion focuses on commodities, some of which (dairy products, 
meat, and non-agricultural products) were not included in the empirical analysis: 
1.  Sugar.  Latin American and Australian production costs are the lowest in the world.  Producers in 
those countries and consumers in importing countries would experience massive gains from freer 
trade. A FTR including Latin America and Australia would enhance economic welfare of the region 
and the world. 
3  As indicated earlier, the FTR equilibrium internal prices p. shown in the Annex provide a breakeven benchmark for judging trade 
diversion or creation.  If  the FTR price is raised above p" trade and welfare are decreased for ROW compared to the outcome with price 
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13 2.  Dairy products.  A FrR excluding low-cost Australia and New Zealand could be trade diverting. 
However,  a  Pacific Rim FrR including  these  dairy product  exporters  could  enhance economic 
welfare of the region and the world.  If  the EC would stop subsidizing dairy exports, a Pacific Rim 
FfR might improve dairy exports and earnings even of u.s. producers. 
3.  Meat.  The Western Hemisphere includes  efficient  meat producers such  as  Argentina.  Unless 
Australia  and New  Zealand are included in  a FrR, the  arrangement could be somewhat  trade 
diverting.  The United States would be competitive in meat production and exports in the absence 
of beef, dairy, and feed subsidies by other countries. 
4.  Non-agricultural products.  East Asia  is  highly  competitive  in  manufactured  products  such  as 
automobiles,  stee~ and machine tools.  Mexico and Brazil could be relatively low-cost suppliers in 
a Western Hemisphere FrR, but that arrangement could  divert  trade from  even more efficient 
producers in East Asia.  East and Southeast Asia also need to be included in a FrR encompassing 
low-cost textile,  appare~ and footwear producers. 
Price data in Table 4 provide further  clues  as  to whether FrRs would be trade creating or trade 
diverting.  GATT rules exempt FrRs from applying the most-favored-nation principle to outsiders, but call for 
FfRs to remove most barriers to trade within the FfR and to erect no more barriers to outsiders than prevailed 
before the FrR. Because scenario solutions were designed to be trade neutral with outsiders, neither decreasing 
nor increasing trade, the resulting within-FrR prices are shadow prices showing breakeven internal prices for 
no net external change in trade based on 1986 conditions.  If  these shadow prices are high relative to reference 
prices, formation of FfRs could unleash pressures to reduce within-FrR prices by diminishing trade barriers. 
In the case of beef, an East Asia FfR without the U.S. would bring a beef price of $5,491  per metric 
ton -- only about haH the Japanese beef price in 1986 but more than double the U.S. price.  Such a FrR would 
face strong pressure to reduce prices and hence to be trade-creating with outsiders.  This outcome indeed is 
suggested by the 1988 U.S.-Japan beef agreement.  Other FfRs that include the U.S. in Table 4 do not give 
prices that are far out of line with reference prices such as the actual U.S. price or free trade world price in 1986. 
Because one would not expect major pressure to raise or lower equilibrium prices and hence change trade levels 
with outsiders, there is no basis to conclude from the information in Table 4 whether the FfRs would be trade 
creating or diverting. 
Table 4.  Producer Prices by Commodity by Region. 
Free Trade Regions 
Southeast  East 
Asia  East  Asia- Western 
Commodity  (ASEAN)  Asia  U.s.  Hemisphere 
($/Metric Ton) 
Beef  NA  5,491  2,418  2,013 
Wheat  115  243  249  196 
<;oarse Grain  83  193  144  122 
Rice  251  1,231  1,080  286 
Sugar  200  481  613  156 

























The conclusion is that a Western Hemisphere FfR would include most low-cost agricultural producers 
but would lose sizable gains from trade by excluding the large consumer food markets of Asia.  An Asian-U.S. 
FrR includes major efficient manufacturers and large markets.  It  would be highly beneficial to U.S. producers 
14 but would disadvantage u.s. food consumers.  Thus the full benefits of a non-European FI'A can be obtained 
only with the full Pacific Rim FI'A. 
Major exclusions from a Pacific Rim FI'R are Europe, the Middle East and North Asia, the Indian 
subcontinent, and Africa.  The major omission from free trade would be minerals, especially petroleum.  OPEC 
has been ineffective of  late and probably extracts little economic rent these days, hence free trade in oil currently 
offers few gains.  That situation could change if  oil supplies become tight relative to demand. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Conventional thinking deems FI'Rs to be welfare enhancing if they are trade creating.  According to 
Krugman (p. 8): 
Loosely speaking, if the extra trade that  takes  place  between members of a  trading bloc 
represents an addition to world trade, the bloc has raised world efficiency  ... 
Schott states (p. 18): 
... trade diversion imposes global welfare losses.  A simple test of the economic value of an [sic] 
FI'A thus could be whether its impact was more trade creating or trade diverting. 
This position that a FTR must be trade-creating to raise world welfare is refuted by the conceptual and empirical 
sections of this paper.  Large welfare gains from FfAs are shown in the paper even without trade creation. 
We summarize welfare gains and suggest lessons for policy. 
1.  Welfare (national income) gains are positive from free trade regions, they are roughly proportional 
to the size of the FI'R, and they are especially large (over $17 billion per year in agriculture alone) 
from a Pacific Rim FI'R (Table 5).  Welfare gains are positive for most individual countries within 
the FI'Rs (see Annex tables).4 
Table 5.  Regional Net Welfare Gains, 1986 Conditions. 
Proportion of 
Welfare Gains  Global Free Trade Gains 
Free Trade Region  Annex Tables  U.s.  Region  U.s.  Region 
($ Billion)  (Percent) 
ASEAN  A-I to A-3  .87  2.92 
East Asia  A-4 to A-6  .76  2.55 
East Asia-U.S.  A-7 to A-9  .89  2.61  10.60  8.76 
Western Hemisphere  A-10 to A-12  4.53  6.86  53.90  23.02 
Pacific Rim  A-13 to A-15  4.33  17.21  51.55  SJ.:J.S. 
Global·  8.60  29.80  100.00  100.00 
i  BIJndford et oJ. 
2.  Welfare gains are small for a FI'R containing relatively homogeneous countries -- as trade theory 
predicts.  An ASEAN or East Asia FI'R without the U.S. links countries with similar comparative 
advantage.  For this reason and because the agricultural industries in these FI'Rs are of modest size, 
free trade gains in these regions are relatively small (less than $1 billion per year) from agriculture. 
"The few  cases  of negative welfare gains  are probably Dot  statistically different from  zero -- although 
statistical tests are unavailable. 
15 3.  An extension of (2) is that welfare gains are sizable from a large FfR containing nations with big 
economies and widely different resource endowments and technologies. A Pacific Rim FfR  provides 
a welfare (national income) gain of over $17 billion or 58 percent of the potential $30 billion gain 
from global free trade in 1986.  As indicated by Viner and by Wonnacott and Lutz (p. 79), the larger 
FfR also is favored because trade diversion will be less important. 
4.  The European Community's Common Agricultural Policy accounted for $12 billion and other West 
European countries for $13 billion or for the entire gap between welfare gains from the Pacific Rim 
¥fA and global free trade.  The conclusion is that a Pacific Rim ¥fA captures the available gains 
from free trade -- given the intransigence of the Western Europe in liberalizing trade as evidenced 
by the Uruguay Round. 
5.  Overall U.S. deadweight gains are about the same for the Pacific Rim and Western Hemisphere 
¥fAs.  Reasons are (a) larger U.S. producers gains with a Western Hemisphere FfR are offset by 
consumer losses compared to the Pacific Rim FfR, and (b) the major gains come from restructuring 
commodity programs to avoid trade restraint and that is possible with either of the two largest ¥fRs 
considered herein. Only partial commodity program restructuring is possible with the East Asia-U.S. 
FfR because resulting high prices retain deadweight welfare losses. 
6.  American agriculture especially benefits from a ¥fA that includes East Asia.  Japan, Taiwan, and 
Korea might be more inclined to join a Pacific Rim than an East Asia (non-U.S.) FTA for several 
reasons.  A Pacific Rim FTA (a) offers larger welfare gains, (b) includes the U.S., Australia, and 
other countries to serve as mediators and "honest brokers" among frequently at-odds East Asian 
nations that would have difficulty forming their own ¥fR, (  c) might give East Asia the food security 
it perceives to be necessary (from the U.S., Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, Canada, and Brazil) 
to  sacrifice  current  self-sufficiency  policies  for  rice  and  other  commodities,  and  (d)  provides 
bargaining power to countervail the EC. Regarding point (a), Japan gains nothing from an East Asia 
FTR excluding the U.S. but gains an estimated $7.2 billion from a Pacific Rim FTA including the 
U.S. (see also Gleckler and Tweeten).  It is well to caution, however, that formation of a Pacific Rim 
FfR may be in the words of Carlisle (p. 280) "slow and undramatic" if  it is possible at all. 
7.  A FfR may raise within-region prices.  Higher prices, greater efficiency, and capital formation may 
increase FfR net exports.  This reduces prices in ROW.  The higher prices within the FfR and 
lower ROW prices mean decIining terms of trade for ROW.  This may benefit ROWand the ¥fR, 
but may be viewed as a beggar-thy-neighbor policy.  That is one reason why many economists favor 
multilateralism under GATT to regionalism.  However, trade rules and adjudication procedures 
under GATT are essential even in a world dominated by FfRs. Regionalism is in this sense not an 
alternative to GATT -- the two are complementary. 
8.  Point  (7)  notwithstanding,  welfare  gains,  especially  for  large  FTRs,  may  be  substantially 
underestimated by the static model used in this study.  The reason is that the empirical procedures 
do not account for long-term gains from stimulation of technological innovation, entrepreneurial 
activities, savings, investment, and capital formation; contributions to economies of size; diminished 
firm  and labor market power; benefits to other industries from reduced food and fiber prices; and 
reduced government administrative and security costs. 
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The following tables are from Lin. 
Table A·l.  Production, Consumption, and Net Trade in the ASEAN Free Trade Region, 1986. 
Country/  Production  Consumption  Net Trade
8 
Commodity  Original  New  Change  Original  New  Change  Original  New  Change 
(1,000 Tons)  (%)  (1,000 Tons)  (%)  (1,000 Tons)  (%) 
Philippines 
Wheat  1  1  0  1,001  1,031  3  ·1,000  ·1,030  3 
Coarse Grain  4,051  4,064  0  4,083  4,115  0  ·32  -51  46 
Rice  5,823  5,543  -5  5,712  5,863  3  111  -320  TR 
Sugar  1,561  1,873  20  1,265  987  -22  296  886  199 
Indonesia 
Wheat  1  1  0  1,601  1,557  -3  -1,600  -1,556  -3 
Coarse Grain  5,361  5,374  0  5,443  5,424  0  -82  -50  -37 
I-'  Rice  26,129  26,098  0  25,937  26,433  2  192  -336  TR 
co  Sugar  1,728  1,517  -12  1,728  1,844  7  0  -327  Large 
Malaysia 
Wheat  1  1  0  614  614  0  -613  -613  0 
Coarse Grain  27  27  0  1,357  1,352  0  -1,330  -1,325  0 
Rice  1,150  967  -16  1,475  1,559  6  -325  -592  82 
Sugar  85  74  -13  628  536  -15  -543  -462  -13 
Thailand 
Wheat  1  1  0  201  205  2  -200  -204  2 
Coarse Grain  4,401  4,375  -1  1,301  1,297  0  3,100  3,078  -1 
Rice  11,880  12,421  5  7,980  7,925  -1  3,900  4,496  15 
Sugar  2,586  2,193  -15  444  500  13  2,142  1,693  -21 
Other SE Asian Countries 
Wheat  246  242  -2  356  361  1  -110  -119  9 
Coarse Grain  408  410  1  383  381  -1  25  29  16 
Rice  7,817  8,243  5  7,454  7,250  -3  363  993  173 
Sugar  391  479  23  128  112  -13  263  367  40 
i  For data on net trade, a positive number indicates imports and a negative number exports.  TR indicates trade reversal. Table A-2.  Producer and Consumer Prices for the ASEAN Free Trade Region, 1986. 
Country/  Producer Price  Consumer Price 
Commodity  Original  New  Change  Original  New  Change 
($fTon)  (%)  ($/Ton)  (%) 
Philippines  138  115  -17  197  174  -12 
Wheat  111  112  1  120  121  0 
Coarse Grain  280  '237  -15  560  517  -8 
Rice  133  200  50  266  333  25 
Sugar 
Indonesia  115  115  0  164  164  0 
Wheat  108  109  1  117  118  1 
Coarse Grain  266  265  0  516  488  -5 
Rice  264  198  -25  596  532  -11 
Sugar 
Malaysia  115  115  0  164  164  0 
Wheat  87  88  1  96  97  1 
Coarse Grain  386  271  -30  772  657  -15 
Rice  350  '239  -32  318  398  25 
Sugar 
Thailand  115  115  0  164  164  0 
Wheat  87  88  1  96  97  1 
Coarse Grain  219  251  14  439  471  7 
Rice  322  213  -34  645  536  -17 
Sugar 
Other Southeast Asian  115  115  0  164  164  0 
Wheat  86  87  1  95  96  1 
Coarse Grain  210  251  19  420  461  10 
Rice  133  200  50  266  333  25 
Sugar 
19 Table A·3.  Welfare Analysis Showing Producer·Government Surplus, Consumer Surplus, and Total Welfare 
Gain With the ASEAN Free Trade Region, 1986.  . 
Country/  Producer· 
Commodity  Government 
Philippines  9 
Wheat  6 
Coarse Grain  -216 
Rice  148 
Sugar 
Country Total  ·53 
Indonesia  0 
Wheat  7 
Coarse Grain  -585 
Rice  -76 
Sugar 
Country Total  ·654 
Malaysia  -52 
Wheat  0 
Coarse Grain  ·86 
Rice  36 
Sugar 
Country Total  ·102 
Thailand  35 
Wheat  388 
Coarse Grain  419 
Rice  ·232 
Sugar 
Country Total  610 
Other Southeast Asian  0 
Wheat  0 
Coarse Grain  361 
Rice  58 
Sugar 
Country Total  419 
Regional Total  297 
20 























































868 Table A-4.  Production, Consumption, and Net Trade in the East Asian Free Trade Region, 1986. 
Country/  Production  Consumption  Net Trade
8 
Commodity  Original  New  Change  Original  New  Change  Original  New  Change 
(1,000 Tons)  (%)  (1,000 Tons)  (%)  (1,000 Tons)  (%) 
Taiwan  4  5  25  43  28  -35  -39  -23  43 
Beef  2  2  -7  868  950  9  -866  -948  9 
Wheat  426  258  -39  4,956  2,967  -40  -4,530  -2,709  -40 
Coarse Grain  1,816  2,316  28  1,643  1,408  -14  173  908  423 
Rice  604  698  16  427  407  -5  177  292  64 
Sugar 
South Korea  208  242  16  208  244  17  0  -3  Large 
Beef  5  5  -1  3,905  3,246  -17  -3,900  -3,241  -17 
Wheat  573  417  -27  4,223  6,895  63  -3,650  -6,479  78 
Coarse Grain  5,607  6,129  9  5,607  5,622  0  0  507  Large 
IV  Rice 
I-'  Sugar 
1  1  29  691  731  6  -690  -730  6 
Japan  559  532  -5  815  818  0  -256  -286  12 
Beef  876  453  -48  6,266  6,452  3  -5,390  -5,999  11 
Wheat  351  196  -44  6,261  5,232  -16  -5,910  -5,036  -15 
Coarse Grain  10,599  9,399  -11  10,619  10,770  1  -20  -1,371  Large 
Rice  943  791  -16  2,796  2,991  7  -1,853  -2,200  19 
Sugar 
Other East Asia  1  1  0  93  77  -17  -92  -76  -18 
Beef  1  1  0  411  379  -8  -410  -378  -8 
Wheat  1  1  0  551  417  -24  -550  -416  -24 
Coarse Grain  1  2  50  557  449  -19  -556  -447  -20 
Rice  1  1  0  688  417  -39  -687  -415  -40 
Sugar 
= 
8  For data on net trade, a positive number indicates imports and a negative number exports.  TR indicates trade reversal. Table A-S.  Producer and Consumer Prices for the East Asian Free Trade Region, 1986. 
Country/  Producer Price  Consumer Price 
Commodity  Original  New  Change  Original  New  Change 
($/Ton)  (%)  ($/Ton)  (%) 
Taiwan  3,576  6,303  76  7,328  10,435  42 
Beef  195  317  63  405  539  33 
Wheat  389  253  -35  136  264  94 
Coarse Grain  365  1,231  237  733  1,578  115 
Rice  352  727  107  873  927  6 
Sugar 
South Korea  4,605  6,292  37  10,056  8,252  -18 
Beef  341  287  -16  199  346  74 
Wheat  422  270  -36  528  283  -46 
Coarse Grain  955  1,231  29  1,230  1,515  23 
Rice  133  481  261  659  614  -7 
Sugar 
Japan  10,140  9,086  -10  16,702  16,643  0 
Beef  1,443  288  -80  376  347  -8 
Wheat  1,260  182  -86  145  197  36 
Coarse Grain  2,274  1,788  -21  2,189  2,093  -4 
Rice  935  633  -32  2,542  2,243  -12 
Sugar 
Other East Asian  2,091  5,491  163  3,802  7,202  89 
Beef  115  243  111  164  292  78 
Wheat  87  204  135  97  214  121 
Coarse Grain  210  1,231  486  420  1,441  243 
Rice  133  481  261  266  614  131 
Sugar 
22 Table A-6.  Welfare Analysis Showing Producer-Government Surplus, Consumer Surplus, and Total Welfare 
Gain With the East Asian Free Trade Region, 1986. 
Country/  Producer-
Commodity  Government 
Taiwan  311 
Beef  310 
Wheat  333 
Coarse Grain  1,920 
Rice  392 
Sugar 
Country Total  3,266 
South Korea  -21 
Beef  324 
Wheat  -1,201 
Coarse Grain  1,777 
Rice  -15 
Sugar 
Country Total  864 
Japan  -1,168 
Beef  -397 
Wheat  228 
Coarse Grain  -657 
Rice  -1,404 
Sugar 
Country Total  -3,398 
Other East Asian  333 
Beef  338 
Wheat  406 
Coarse Grain  104 
Rice  257 
Sugar 
Country Total  1,438 
Regional Total  2,171 
23 





















































761 Table A-7.  Production, Consumption, and Net Trade in the East Asia-U.S. Free Trade Region, 1986. 
Production  Consumption  Net Trade· 
Country  Commodity  Original  New  Change  Original  New  Change  Original  New  Change 
(1,000 Tons)  (%)  (1,000 Tons)  (%)  (1,000 Tons)  (%) 
U.s.  Beef  11,292  11,486  2  12,031  11,467  -5  -739  19  TR 
Wheat  56,925  53,140  -7  30,173  26,822  -11  26,752  26,319  -2 
Coarse Grain  252,948  242,264  -4  206,507  192,988  -7  46,441  49,275  6 
Rice  4,280  5,254  23  1,644  1,262  -23  2,636  3,992  51 
Sugar  5,461  5,391  -1  7,158  7,542  5  -1,697  -2,151  27 
Tadwan  Beef  4  4  0  43  46  8  -39  -43  10 
Wheat  2  2  0  868  891  3  -866  -890  3 
Coarse Grain  426  219  -49  4,956  3,900  -21  -4,530  -3,681  -19 
Rice  1,816  2,256  24  1,643  1,432  -13  173  824  374 
Sugar  604  733  21  427  348  -18  177  385  117 
"-"'apan  Beef  559  385  -31  815  1,178  45  -256  -793  210 
.t:.  Wheat  876  477  -46  6,266  6,297  0  -5,390  -5,820  8 
Coarse Grain  351  168  -52  6,261  5,783  -8  -5,910  -5,615  -5 
Rice  10,599  8,801  -17  10,619  11,024  4  -20  -2,223  11,595 
Sugar  943  883  -6  2,796  2,873  3  -1,853  -1,990  7 
South  Beef  208  160  -23  208  380  83  0  -220 
Korea  Wheat  5  5  7  3,905  3,095  21  -3,900  -3,090  -21 
Coarse Grain  573  370  -35  4,223  8,070  91  -3,650  -7,700  111 
Rice  5,607  5,853  4  5,607  5,751  3  0  102 
Sugar  1  1  36  691  627  -9  -690  -625  -9 
Other  Beef  1  1  0  93  91  -2  -92  -90  9 
East  Wheat  1  1  0  411  334  -19  -410  -333  82 
Asia  Coarse Grain  1  1  0  551  480  -13  -550  -479  68 
Rice  1  2  52  557  463  -17  -556  -461  207 
.Sugar  1  2  54  688  371  -46  -687  -369  180 
• For data on net trade, a positive number indicates imports and a negative number exports.  TR indicates trade reversal. Table A-8.  Producer and Consumer Prices for the East Asia-U.s. Free Trade Region, 1986. 
Country/  Producer Price  Consumer Price 
Commodity  Original  New  Change  Original  New  Change 
($/Ton)  (%)  ($/Ton)  (%) 
U.S.  2,049  2,120  3  3,414  3,656  7 
Beef  168  148  -12  122  184  51 
Wheat  102  93  -9  78  101  29 
Coarse Grain  348  581  67  244  703  188 
Rice  324  309  -5  885  712  -20 
Sugar 
Taiwan  3,576  2,n5  -22  7,328  6,907  -6 
Beef  195  325  67  405  547  35 
Wheat  389  185  -53  136  196  44 
Coarse Grain  365  1,080  196  733  1,427  95 
Rice  352  927  163  873  1,127  29 
Sugar 
Japan  10,140  4,000  -61  16,702  11,557  45 
Beef  1,443  296  -80  374  355  5 
Wheat  1,260  136  -89  145  151  -8 
Coarse Grain  2,274  1,568  -31  2,189  1,873  4 
Rice  935  808  -14  2,542  2,418  3 
Sugar 
South Korea  4,605  2,nO  -40  10,056  4,730  -53 
Beef  341  295  0  199  354  78 
Wheat  422  202  -52  528  215  -59 
Coarse Grain  955  1,080  13  1,230  1,364  11 
Rice  133  613  360  659  746  13 
Sugar 
Other East Asia  2,091  2,418  16  3,802  4,129  9 
Beef  115  249  117  164  298  82 
Wheat  87  153  75  97  163  68 
Coarse Grain  210  1,080  414  420  1,290  207 
Rice  133  613  361  266  746  180 
Sugar 
25 Table A-9.  Welfare Analysis Showing Producer-Government Surplus, Consumer Surplus, and Total Welfare 
Gain With the East Asia-U.S. Free Trade Region, 1986. 
Welfare Gain to: 
Producer-
Country  Commodity  Government  Consumer  Total 
($ Million) 
U.S.  Beef  2,635  -2,845  -210 
Wheat  1,902  -1,742  160 
Coarse Grain  4,932  -4,455  477 
Rice  521  -648  -127 
Sugar  -682  1,272  590 
Country Total  9,308  -8,418  890 
Taiwan  Beef  -18  19  1 
Wheat  -29  -114  -143 
Coarse Grain  -83  -248  -331 
Rice  1,144  -1,040  104 
Sugar  278  -98  180 
Country Total  1,292  -1,481  -189 
Japan  Beef  -3,572  5,012  1,440 
Wheat  -732  132  -600 
Coarse Grain  -188  -36  -224 
Rice  -2,766  3,415  649 
Sugar  -630  353  -277 
Country Total  -7,888  8,876  988 
South Kor1!a  Beef  -991  1,464  473 
Wheat  -15  533  518 
Coarse Grain  1,391  1,877  3,268 
Rice  724  -741  -17 
Sugar  6  -57  -51 
Country Total  1,115  3,076  4,191 
Other East Asia  Beef  369  0  369 
Wheat  0  -2,171  -2,171 
Coarse Grain  0  -1,967  -1,967 
Rice  0  -1,943  -1,943 
Sugar  2,444  0  2,444 
Country Total  2,813  -6,081  -3,268 
Regional Total  6,640  -4,028  2,612 
26 Table A-I0.  Production, Consumption, and Net Trade in the Western Hemisphere Free Trade Region, 1986. 
Production  Consumption  Net Trade· 
Country  Commodity  Original  New  Change  Original  New  Change  Original  New  Change 
(1,000 Tons)  (%)  (1,000 Tons)  (%)  (1,000 Tons)  (%) 
U.s.  Beef  11,292  10,227  -9  12,031  12,317  2  -739  -2,089  183 
Wheat  56,925  46,843  -18  30,173  28,062  -7  26,752  18,781  -30 
Coarse Grain  252,948  225,316  -11  206,507  196,633  -5  46,441  28,683  -38 
Rice  4,280  3,687  -14  1,644  1,567  -5  2,636  2,120  -20 
Sugar  5,461  3,747  -31  7,158  8,089  13  -1,697  -4,342  156 
Canada  Beef  1,040  946  -9  1,047  1,072  2  -7  -126  Large 
Wheat  31,377  32,652  4  10,567  10,292  -3  20,810  22,360  7 
Coarse Grain  25,672  22,344  -13  19,219  17,557  -9  6,453  4,787  -26 
Rice  1  1  0  121  116  -4  -120  -115  -4 
Sugar  60  53  -11  1,138  1,134  0  -1,078  -1,080  0 
IV Mexico  Beef  1,200  1,383  15  1,200  860  -28  0  522  Large 
.......  Wheat  4,500  5,613  25  4,997  4,554  -9  -497  1,059  314 
Coarse Grain  14,840  10,407  -30  19,020  17,104  -10  -4,180  -6,697  61 
Rice  351  593  69  351  . 309  -12  0  285  Large 
Sugar  3,928  4,109  5  3,736  3,478  -7  192  631  228 
Other  Beef  366  360  -2  294  299  2  72  62  -14 
Central  Wheat  46  55  20  2,981  2,582  -13  -2,935  -2,527  -14 
American  Coarse Grain  3,066  3,378  10  4,416  3,943  -11  -1,350  -565  -58 
and  Rice  1,464  1,725  18  1,796  1,608  -10  -332  116  TR 
Caribbean  Sugar  10,720  11,173  4  1,936  1,889  -2  8,784  9,284  6 
Brazil  Beef  2,000  2,167  8  2,080  2,110  1  -80  57  TR 
Wheat  5,600  5,422  -3  8,400  7,015  -16  -2,800  -1,593  -43 
Coarse Grain  27,134  35,399  30  27,394  22,134  -19  -260  13,265  TR 
Rice  7,140  6,338  -11  7,190  6,907  -4  -50  -569  Large 
Sugar  8,400  9,466  13  5,800  5,520  -5  2,600  3,946  52 
• For data on net trade, a positive number indicates imports and a negative number exports.  TR indicates trade reversal. Table A·IO continued. 
Production  Consumption  Net Trade· 
Country  Commodity  Original  New  Change  Original  New  Change  Original  New  Change 
(1,000 Tons)  (%)  (1,000 Tons)  (%)  (1,000 Tons)  (%) 
Argentina  Beef  2,850  3,406  19  2,599  2,294  ·12  251  1,111  341 
Wheat  9,000  10,900  21  4,560  4,276  -6  4,440  6,624  49 
Coarse Grain  13,290  18,911  42  7,410  6,331  ·15  5,880  12,580  114 
Rice  275  327  19  125  123  -1  150  204  35 
Sugar  1,160  1,240  7  1,011  969  -4  149  272  82 
Venezuela  Beef  307  304  ·1  307  313  2  0  -9  Large 
Wheat  1  1  0  1,051  943  -10  -1,050  -942  -10 
Coarse Grain  1,890  1,464  -23  2,740  3,241  18  -850  -1,776  109 
Rice  209  162  -23  209  223  7  0  -61  Large 
Sugar  569  634  11  693  665  -4  -124  -31  -76 
f'V Other  Beef  1,127  1,108  -2  958  970  I  169  137  -19 
co  Latin  Wheat  2,650  3,082  16  5,347  4,821  -10  -2,697  -1,739  -36 
American  Coarse Grain  5,214  5,937  14  6,025  4,891  -19  -811  1,046  TR 
Rice  2,286  2,582  13  2,282  2,274  0  4  308  Large 
Sugar  2,788  2,888  4  2,787  2,741  -2  1  146  Large Table A·11.  Producer and Consumer Prices for the Western Hemisphere Free Trade Region, 1986. 
Producer Price  Consumer Price 
Country  Commodity  Original  New  Change  Original  New  Change 
($/Ton)  (%)  ($/Ton)  (%) 
U.S.  Beef  2,049  1,766  ·14  3,414  3,302  ·3 
Wheat  168  117  ·31  122  153  25 
Coarse Grain  102  79  ·22  78  87  12 
Rice  475  327  ·31  371  449  21 
Sugar  412  182  ·56  973  585  ·40 
Canada  Beef  2,205  1,909  ·13  3,664  3,558  ·3 
Wheat  149  153  3  150  191  27 
Coarse Grain  87  73  ·16  54  78  45 
Rice  240  327  36  450  537  19 
Sugar  268  182  ·32  299  304  2 
Mexico  Beef  1,255  2,013  60  2,281  3,039  33 
Wheat  111  155  40  135  209  55 
Coarse Grain  143  110  ·23  65  122  87 
Rice  163  327  101  326  490  50 
Sugar  145  182  25  289  326  13 
Other  Beef  2,091  2,013  ·4  3,802  3,724  ·2 
Central  Wheat  115  196  70  164  245  49 
American  Coarse Grain  86  128  49  95  137  45 
&  Rice  210  286  36  420  496  18 
Caribbean  Sugar  133  156  17  266  289  9 
Brazil  Beef  1,000  1,174  17  2,218  2,172  ·2 
Wheat  278  255  ·8  236  360  53 
Coarse Grain  114  170  49  123  179  46 
Rice  308  235  ·24  358  414  16 
Sugar  133  156  17  266  289  9 
Argentina  Beef  900  1,285  43  1,636  2,021  24 
Wheat  68  98  44  95  125  31 
Coarse Grain  39  66  69  43  70  62 
Rice  210  286  36  420  496  18 
Sugar  133  156  17  266  289  9 
Venezuela  Beef  2,091  2,013  -4  3,802  3,724  ·2 
Wheat  81  138  70  114  171  50 
Coarse Grain  293  169  -42  323  199  ·38 
Rice  497  307  ·38  994  804  -19 
Sugar  133  156  17  266  289  9 
Other  Beef  2,091  2,013  -4  3,802  3,724  -2 
Latin  Wheat  115  196  70  164  245  49 
American  Coarse Grain  86  128  49  95  137  45 
Rice  210  286  36  420  496  18 
Sugar  133  156  17  266  289  9 
29 Table A-12.  Welfare Analysis Showing Producer-Government Surplus, Consumer Surplus, and Total Welfare 
Gain With the Western Hemisphere Free Trade Region, 1986. 
Welfare Gain to:  Welfare Gain to: 
Country/  Producer- Consumer  Total  Country/  Producer- Consumer  Total 
Commodity  Government  Commodity  Government 
($ Million)  ($ Million) 
U.S.  Argentina 
Beef  -1,184  1,369  185  Beef  1,096  -939  156 
Wheat  2,564  -891  1,673  Wheat  332  -130  203 
C. Grain  3,907  -1,843  2,064  C.Grain  374  -176  197 
Rice  401  -125  276  Rice  20  -9  11 
Sugar  -2,613  2,942  329  Sugar  26  -23  3 
Total  3,075  1,452  4,527  Total  1,848  -1,277  571 
Canada  Venezuela 
Beef  -130  112  -18  Beef  -23  24  1 
Wheat  1,837  -425  1,412  Wheat  0  -57  -57 
C. Grain  634  -445  188  C. Grain  -351  368  17 
Rice  0  -10  -10  Rice  -32  42  9 
Sugar  -23  -5  -28  Sugar  15  -16  0 
Total  2,318  -773  1,545  Total  -391  361  -30 
Mexico  Other LAb 
Beef  979  -767  212  Beef  -90  75  -15 
Wheat  379  -345  34  Wheat  216  -405  -189 
C. Grain  915  -987  -72  C.Grain  201  -228  -26 
Rice  83  -53  30  Rice  167  -168  -1 
Sugar  145  -132  13  Sugar  61  -63  -2 




Wheat  4  -221  -218 
C.Grain  133  -177  -44  Regional  13,457  -6,596  6,862 
Rice  118  -130  -12  Total 
Sugar  243  -44  199 
Total  498  -572  -50 
Brazil 
Beef  -79  96  16 
Wheat  751  0943  -191 
C. Grain  1,778  -1,370  408 
Rice  414  -390  24 
Sugar  224  -129  95 
Total  3,088  -2,737  351 
'Other Central American &  CarIbbean.  bOther Latm American. 
Cather East Asian.  dOther Southeast Asian. 
30 Table A·13.  Production, Consumption, and Net Trade in the Pacific Rim Free Trade Region, 1986. 
Production  Consumption  Net Trade-
Country  Commodity  Original  New  Change  Original  New  Change  Original  New  Change 
(1,000 Tons)  (%)  (1,000 Tons)  (%)  (1,000 Tons)  (%) 
U.s.  Beef  11,292  10,554  ·7  12,031  12,096  1  -739  ·1,542  109 
Wheat  56,925  44,536  -22  30,173  28,688  -5  26,752  15,848  -41 
Coarse Grain  252,948  224,574  ·11  206,507  198,257  -4  46,441  26,317  ·43 
Rice  4,280  3,985  -7  1,644  1,511  ·8  2,636  2,474  -6 
Sugar  5,461  4,014  ·26  7,158  8,012  12  -1,697  -3,998  136 
Canada  Beef  1,040  970  -7  1,047  1,050  0  -7  -80  Large 
Wheat  31,377  31,388  0  10,567  10,421  -1  20,810  20,967  1 
Coarse Grain  25,672  22,645  -12  19,219  17,667  -8  6,453  4,978  ·23 
Rice  1  1  5  121  112  -7  -120  -111  -7 
Sugar  60  55  ·8  1,138  1,114  -2  ·1,078  -1,058  -2 
~Mexico  Beef  1,200  1,403  17  1,200  829  -31  0  574  TR 
Wheat  4,500  5,367  19  4,997  4,643  -7  -497  723  TR 
Coarse Grain  14,840  10,289  -31  19,020  17,158  -10  -4,180  -6,869  64 
Rice  351  677  93  351  ·291  -17  0  386  TR 
Sugar  3,928  4,211  7  3,736  3,334  -11  192  877  355 
Other  Beef  366  367  0  294  293  0  72  75  4 
Central  Wheat  46  51  12  2,981  2,684  -10  -2,935  -2,633  10 
American  Coarse Grain  3,066  3,327  9  4,416  3,977  -10  -1,350  -650  52 
&  Rice  1,464  1,907  30  1,796  1,494  -17  -332  413  TR 
Caribbean  Sugar  10,720  11,547  8  1,936  1,851  -4  8,784  9,696  10 
Brazil  Beef  2,000  2,220  11  2,080  2,072  0  -80  148  TR 
Wheat  5,600  5,250  -6  8,400  7,345  -13  -2,800  -2,095  25 
Coarse Grain  27,134  35,131  29  27,394  22,468  -18  -260  12,664  TR 
Rice  7,140  7,105  0  7,190  6,331  -12  -50  n4  TR 
Sugar  8,400  9,911  18  5,800  5,299  -9  2,600  4,612  n 
• For data on net trade, a positive number indicates imports and a negative number exports.  TR indicates trade reversal. Table A·13 continued. 
Production  Consumption  Net Trade· 
Country  Commodity  Original  New  Change  Original  New  Change  Original  New  Change 
(1,000 Tons)  (%)  (1,000 Tons)  (%)  (1,000 Tons)  (%) 
Argentina  Beef  2,850  3,488  22  2,599  2,253  -13  251  1,235  390 
Wheat  9,000  10,364  15  4,560  4,371  -4  4,440  5,993  35 
Coarse Grain  13,290  18,855  42  7,410  6,376  -14  5,880  12,479  112 
Rice  .  275  381  38  125  116  -7  150  264  76 
Sugar  1,160  1,308  13  1,011  935  -8  149  374  150 
Venezuela  Beef  307  312  2  307  306  °  ° 
6  TR 
Wheat  1  1  38  1,051  963  -8  -1,050  -961  8 
Coarse Grain  1,890  1,419  -25  2,740  3,275  20  -850  -1,856  119 
Rice  209  183  -13  209  219  5  ° 
-36  TR 
Sugar  569  666  17  693  643  -7  -124  24  TR 
wOtber  Beef  1,127  1,132  ° 
958  955  ° 
169  177  5 
tv Latin  Wheat  2,650  2,930  11  5,347  4,978  -7  -2,697  -2,048  -24 
American  Coarse Grain  5,214  5,818  12  6,025  5,021  -17  -811  798  TR 
Rice  2,286  2,879  26  2,282  '2,150  -6  4  729  Large 
Sugar  2,788  2,973  7  2,787  2,704  -3  1  268  Large 
Australia  Beef  1,478  1,438  -3  669  666  ° 
809  771  -5 
Wheat  16,190  20,998  30  690  646  -6  15,500  20,352  31 
Coarse Grain  6,650  9,166  38  3,360  2,965  -12  3,290  6,201  88 
Rice  392  510  30  27  22  -17  365  488  33 
Sugar  3,404  3,677  8  546  524  -4  2,858  3,153  10 
New  Beef  466  448  -4  126  126  ° 
340  323  -5 
Zealand  Wheat  400  544  36  380  353  -7  20  191  816 
Coarse Grain  916  1,183  29  630  561  -11  286  622  117 
Rice  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
Sugar  1  1  6  167  162  -3  -166  -161  -3 
• For data on net trade, a positive number indicates imports and a negative number exports. Table A·13 continued. 
Production  Consumption  Net Trade· 
Country  Commodity  Original  New  Change  Original  New  Change  Original  New  Change 
(1,000 Tons)  (%)  (1,000 Tons)  (%)  (1,000 Tons)  (%) 
Taiwan  Beef  4  3  -14  43  49  15  ·39  -46  18 
Wheat  2  2  8  868  832  -4  -866  -830  -4 
Coarse Grain  426  254  -40  4,956  3,995  -19  -4,530  -3,741  -17 
Rice  1,816  1,798  -1  1,643  1,689  3  173  109  -37 
Sugar  604  572  ·5  427  704  65  177  -132  TR 
South  Beef  208  150  -28  208  404  94  0  -254  Large 
Korea  Wheat  5  5  0  3,905  2,954  -24  -3,900  -2,948  24 
Coarse Grain  573  439  -23  4,223  8,016  90  -3,650  -7,577  108 
Rice  5,607  3,937  -30  5,607  6,406  14  0  -2,469  Large 
Sugar  1  1  0  691  1,256  82  -690  -1,255  82 
w Japan  Beef  559  366  -35  815  1,232  51  -256  -866  239 
w  Wheat  876  457  -48  6,266  6,320  1  -5,390  -5,864  9 
Coarse Grain  351  191  -46  6,261  5,860  -6  -5,910  -5,670  -4 
Rice  10,599  4,995  -53  10,619  13,407  26  -20  -8,412  Large 
Sugar  943  584  -38  2,796  3,276  17  -1,853  -2,692  45 
Other  Beef  1  1  0  93  93  0  -92  -92  0 
East  Wheat  1  1  0  411  323  -21  -410  -322  21 
Asian  Coarse Grain  1  1  0  551  495  -10  -550  -494  10 
Rice  1  1  0  557  547  -2  -556  -546  2 
Sugar  1  1  0  688  629  -9  -687  -628  9 
PhilippInes  Beef  95  93  -2  99  100  1  -4  -7  -96 
Wheat  1  1  0  1,001  953  -5  -1,000  -952  5 
Coarse Grain  4,051  4,457  10  4,083  3,695  -9  -32  761  TR 
Rice  5,823  6,031  4  5,712  5,596  -2  111  435  289 
Sugar  1,561  1,713  10  1,265  1,125  -11  296  588  98 
• For data on net trade, a positive number indicates imports and a negative number exports. Table A-13 continued. 
Production  Consumption  Net Trade· 
Country  Commodity  Original  New  Change  Original  New  Change  Original  New  Change 
(1,000 Tons)  (%)  (1,000 Tons)  (%)  (1,000 Tons)  (%) 
Indonesia  Beef  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
Wheat  1  1  0  1,601  1,187  -26  -1,600  4,599  TR 
Coarse Grain  5,361  5,786  8  5,443  4,890  -10  -82  23,902  TR 
Rice  26,129  28,792  10  25,937  24,752  -5  192  -23,194  TR 
Sugar  1,728  1,558  -10  1,728  2,002  16  0  -2,002  TR 
Malaysia  Beef  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
Wheat  1  1  0  614  569  -7  -613  -568  7 
Coarse Grain  27  30  10  1,357  1,221  -10  -1,330  -1,191  10 
Rice  1,150  1,140  -1  1,475  1,494  1  -325  -354  -9 
Sugar  85  70  -17  628  567  -10  -543  -496  9 
wThaiiand  Beef  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
~  Wheat  1  1  0  201  169  -16  -200  -168  16 
Coarse Grain  4,401  5,284  20  1,301  1,171  -10  3,100  4,113  33 
Rice  11,880  13,838  16  7,980  7,777  -3  3,900  6,061  55 
Sugar  2,586  2,086  -19  444  515  16  2,142  1,570  -27 
Other  Beef  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
Southeast  Wheat  246  280  14  356  325  -9  -110  -45  59 
Asian  Coarse Grain  408  486  19  383  327  -15  25  159  517 
Rice  7,817  9,094  16  7,454  6,846  -8  363  2,248  518 
Sugar  391  450  15  128  122  -5  263  328  25 
• For data on net trade, a positive number indicates imports and a negative number exports. Table A·14.  Producer and Consumer Prices for the Pacific Rim Free Trade Region, 1986. 
Producer Price  Consumer Price 
Country  Commodity  Original  New  Change  Original  New  Change 
($jTon)  (%)  ($/Ton)  (%) 
U.S.  Beef  2,049  1,852  ·10  3,414  3,388  -1 
Wheat  168  107  -36  122  143  17 
Coarse Grain  102  78  -24  78  86  10 
Rice  348  397  14  244  519  113 
Sugar  324  205  -37  885  608  -31 
Canada  Beef  2,205  2,002  -9  3,664  3,651  0 
Wheat  149  141  -6  150  179  19 
Coarse Grain  84  72  -15  51  77  51 
Rice  210  397  89  420  607  45 
Sugar  213  205  -4  244  327  34 
Mexico  Beef  1,255  2,111  68  2,281  3,137  38 
Wheat  111  142  28  135  196  45 
Coarse Grain  146  107  -26  68  119  76 
Rice  163  397  144  326  560  72 
Sugar  145  205  42  289  349  21 
Other  Beef  2,091  2,111  1  3,802  3,822  1 
Central  Wheat  115  180  56  164  229  40 
American  Coarse Grain  82  126  54  91  135  48 
&  Rice  210  348  66  420  558  33 
Caribbean  Sugar  133  176  32  266  309  16 
Brazil  Beef  1,000  1,232  23  2,218  2,230  1 
Wheat  358  235  -34  316  340  7 
Coarse Grain  82  167  104  91  176  93 
Rice  308  320  4  358  499  39 
Sugar  133  176  32  266  309  16 
Argentina  Beef  900  1,348  50  1,636  2,084  27 
Wheat  68  90  32  95  117  23 
Coarse Grain  36  64  79  40  68  71 
Rice  210  348  66  420  558  33 
Sugar  133  176  32  266  309  16· 
Venezuela  Beef  2,091  2,111  1  3,802  3,822  1 
Wheat  81  127  56  114  160  40 
Coarse Grain  270  165  -39  300  196  -35 
Rice  497  373  ·25  994  870  -13 
Sugar  133  176  32  266  309  16 
35 Table A·14 continued. 
Producer Price  Consumer Price 
Country  Commodity  Original  New  Change  Original  New  Change 
($/Ton)  (%)  ($/Ton)  (%) 
Other  Beef  2,091  2,111  1  3,802  3,822  1 
Latin  Wheat  115  180  56  164  229  40 
American  Coarse Grain  82  126  54  91  135  48 
Rice  210  348  66  420  558  33 
Sugar  133  176  32  266  309  16 
Australia  Beef  1,226  1,178  -4  2,122  2,133  1 
Wheat  82  109  33  100  139  39 
Coarse Grain  69  100  44  75  108  43 
Rice  121  348  187  168  411  144 
Sugar  125  176  41  214  283  32 
New  Beef  1,150  1,056  -8  1,744  1,754  1 
Zealand  Wheat  115  180  56  164  229  40 
Coarse Grain  82  122  48  91  131  43 
Rice  NA  NA  NA  NA 
Sugar  133  176  32  266  309  16 
Taiwan  Beef  5,358  2,419  ·55  9,110  6,551  -28 
Wheat  275  235  ·15  485  457  -6 
Coarse Grain  389  168  ·57  136  124  -8 
Rice  502  348  ·31  870  695  ·20 
Sugar  352  267  ·24  873  467  -46 
South  Beef  4,605  2,419  -47  10,056  4,379  ·56 
Korea  Wheat  341  213  -38  199  272  37 
_.  Coarse Grain  426  168  -60  532  181  -66 
Rice  1,030  348  ·66  1,305  632  ·52 
Sugar  133  176  32  659  309  -53 
Japan  Beef  10,140  3,494  -66  16,702  11,051  ·34 
Wheat  1,443  213  ·85  376  272  ·28 
Coarse Grain  1,260  113  -91  145  128  -12 
Rice  2,274  505  -78  2,189  810  -63 
Sugar  1,026  353  ·66  2,633  1,963  -25 
Other  Beef  2,091  2,111  1  3,802  3,822  1 
East  Wheat  115  180  56  164  229  40 
Asian  Coarse Grain  87  127  46  97  137  42 
Rice  210  348  66  420  558  33 
Sugar  133  176  32  266  309  16 
36 Table A-14 continued. 
Producer Price  Consumer Price 
Country  Commodity  Original  New  Change  Original  New  Change 
($/Ton)  (%)  ($/Ton)  (%) 
Philippines  Beef  2,196  2,111  -4  3,992  3,907  -2 
Wheat  138  180  30  197  239  21 
Coarse Grain  82  163  98  91  172  89 
Rice  280  330  18  560  610  9 
Sugar  133  176  32  266  309  16 
Indonesia  Beef  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
Wheat  115  180  56  164  229  40 
Coarse Grain  82  158  93  91  167  84 
Rice  266  368  38  516  591  14 
Sugar  331  263  -21  663  597  -10 
Malaysia  Beef  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
Wheat  115  180  56  164  229  40 
Coarse Grain  82  127  55  91  136  50 
Rice  386  358  -7  772  762  -1 
Sugar  350  211  -40  318  370  16 
Thailand  Beef  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
Wheat  115  180  56  164  229  40 
Coarse Grain  82  127  55  91  136  50 
Rice  219  348  59  439  568  19 
Sugar  322  188  -42  645  511  -21 
Other  Beef  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA  NA 
South  Wheat  115  180  56  164  229  40 
East  Coarse Grain  82  126  54  91  135  48 
Asian  Rice  210  348  66  420  558  33 
Sugar  133  176  32  266  309  16 
37 Table A-IS.  Welfare Analysis Showing Producer-Government Surplus, Consumer Surplus, and Total Welfare 
Gain With the Pacific Rim Free Trade Region, 1986. 
Welfare Gain to:  Welfare Gain to: 
Country/  Producer- Consumer  Total  Country/  Producer- Consumer  Total 
Commodity  Government  Commodity  Government 
($ Million)  ($ Million) 
U.S.  Argentina 
Beef  -280  315  36  Beef  1,316  -1,082  233 
Wheat  2,134  -626  1,508  Wheat  248  -96  152 
C.  Grain  3,655  -1,542  2,113  C. Grain  358  -169  189 
Rice  670  -233  437  Rice  41  -16  25 
Sugar  -2,517  2,751  233  Sugar  51  -42  9 
Total  3,662  665  4,327  Total  2,014  -1,405  609 
Canada  Venezuela 
Beef  -36  13  -23  Beef  11  -6  4 
Wheat  1,447  -298  1,149  Wheat  0  -46  -46 
C. Grain  629  -420  208  C. Grain  -358  380  22 
Rice  0  -18  -18  Rice  -21  27  6 
Sugar  -22  -32  -54  Sugar  28  -29  ·1 
Total  2,018  ·756  1,262  Total  340  326  -15 
Mexico  Other LAb 
Beef  1,120  -851  269  Beef  23  ·20  4 
Wheat  310  ·289  22  Wheat  161  -329  -168 
C. Grain  897  -952  ·55  C. Grain  182  -216  ·33 
Rice  128  -73  55  Rice  336  -296  40 
Sugar  244  ·213  31  Sugar  118  ·119  -1 
Total  2,700  -2,378  322  Total  820  -979  -159 
OCA&C·  ~  Australia 
Beef  7  -6  1  Beef  18  -8  10 
Wheat  3  -180  -178  Wheat  705  -26  679 
C.Grain  Ul  -167  -46  C. Grain  258  -99  158 
Rice  225  ·225  0  Rice  61  -3  58 
Sugar  468  -82  386  Sugar  150  -23  127 
Total  824  -660  164  Total  1,192  -159  1,033 
Brazil  New Zealand 
Beef  50  -25  25  Beef  5  -I .  4 
Wheat  640  -797  -156  Wheat  29  -24  5 
C. Grain  1,681  -1,298  383  C.Grain  38  -23  15 
Rice  973  -935  38  Rice  NA  NA  NA 
Sugar  393  -239  154  Sugar  0  -7  -7 
Total  3,737  -3,294  443  Total  72  -55  17 
'Other Cent  rat Amencan & Caribbean.  bOther Latin American. 
Cather East Asian.  dOther Southeast Asian. 
38 Table A-IS continued. 
Welfare Gain to:  Welfare Gain to: 
Country/  Producer- Consumer  Total  Country/  Producer- Consumer  Total 
Commodity  Government  Commodity  Government 
($ Million)  ($ Million) 
Taiwan  Indonesia 
Beef  -34  36  2  Beef  NA  NA  NA 
Wheat  -29  -43  -72  Wheat  ° 
-86  -86 
C. Grain  -91  -117  -208  C. Grain  280  -258  22 
Rice  -39  64  25  Rice  2,103  -1,885  218 
Sugar  -164  219  59  Sugar  -109  127  18 
Total  -354  159  -195  Total  2,274  -2,102  172 
South Korea  Malaysia  NA 
Beef  -1,122  1,602  480  Beef  NA  -38  NA 
Wheat  -15  -266  -281  Wheat  ° 
-52  -38 
C. Grain  -1,636  1,938  302  C. Grain  1  15  -51 
Rice  -2,902  3,562  660  Rice  -62  -31  -47 
Sugar  -271  319  47  Sugar  5  -106  -25 
Total  -5,947  7,155  1,208  Total  -56  -162 
Japan  Thailand 
Beef  -4,035  5,622  1,587  Beef  NA  NA  NA 
Wheat  -757  613  -144  Wheat  ° 
-11  -11 
C. Grain  -188  95  -93  C. Grain  182  -50  132 
Rice  -10,284  16,040  5,756  Rice  1,697  -1,014  683 
Sugar  -1,923  2,021  98  Sugar  71  64  135 
Total  -17,187  24,391  7,204  Total  1,950  -1,011  939 
Other EA
c  Other SEAd 
Beef  ° 
-2  -2  Beef  NA  NA  NA 
Wheat  ° 
-21  -21  Wheat  16  -22  -6 
C. Grain  0  -20  -20  C. Grain  18  -14  4 
Rice  ° 
-74  -74  Rice  1,170  -982  188 
Sugar  ° 
-28  -28  Sugar  18  -5  13 
Total  0  -146  -146  Total  1,222  -1,023  199 
Philippines 
Beef  -8  8  °  -Wheat  -23  -41  -64 
C.Grain  220  -199  21  Regional 
Rice  295  -279  16  Total  -845  18,059  17,214 
Sugar  67  -51  17 
Total  551  -561  -10 
'Other Central American &  Caribbean.  DOther Latin American. 
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